I. INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was enacted in 1967 with the primary goals``to promote the employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment'' (ADEA, 1967: 29 U.S.C. x 621 (b)). It is the subject of approximately 16,000 annual charge receipts with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), as well as substantial court litigation (EEOC, 2001) . 1 The limited empirical research on the impacts of the ADEA finds that it has positive effects on the employment of protected workers (Neumark and Stock, 1999; Adams, 2000) . However, legal scholars have raised questions about the ability of the ADEA to protect older workers from employmentdiscriminationandpositthatsome older workers may instead be better protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (Frier, 1993; Posner, 1995) . Frier (1993) notes that gaps in coverage of the ADEA based on bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs), and exceptions made for factors other than age exempt some older workers from protection under the ADEA (for example, an employer does not violate the ADEA if he discharges an employee on the basis of an age-related disability). These workers may be eligible for protection under disability discrimination laws, however, because some of the characteristics that often accompany age (e.g., frailty, mild cognitive impairment, or failing hearing or vision) may fall under the provisions of disability discrimination legislation that does not include a BFOQ exception but instead applies to any qualified individual with a disability. In this sense, Frier argues, the ADA makes a BFOQ defense under the ADEA more difficult because some age-related employment problems could be solved by reasonable accommodations.
Although age in itself is not considered a disability under the ADA, the language of the act clearly acknowledges that disability and age are correlated, noting,``some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older'' (ADA, 1990: 42 U.S.C. x 12101 (2) (a) (1)). Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, the positive relationship between age and disability status is quite striking, hovering below 10% for those under age 40, but rising fairly dramatically starting around age 45, and affecting one-quarter of the population by age 60 and one-third of the population by age 65. As noted by Posner (1995, p. 339) ,``The interaction between [the ADA and ADEA] has yet to be explored by the courts F F F. The ADA may succeed in helping older workers where the ADEA has been ineffective.'' The interaction between these two types of laws has yet to be explored by empirical researchers as well. Given Frier's argument, whether the protective effect of age discrimination laws is affected when age laws are coupled with disability discrimination laws is of particular interest. In addition, because prohibitions against discrimination in firing and reasonable accommodation requirements in disability discrimination laws raise the cost of employing the disabled, whether the coupling of the laws is associated with net increases in employment or earnings of protected workers is also of interest.
The purpose of this article is to investigate (1) whether there are interaction effects between age discrimination and disability discrimination laws in terms of labor market outcomes and (2) whether the coupling of the laws is associated with net employment or earnings changes, relative to age-law protection alone. An investigation of the ADEA and ADA is somewhat problematic, however, because these policies have near-universal coverage for their protected groups, making it difficult to identify a comparison group that can be used to control for changes in relative outcomes that are unrelated to the legislation. However, at the time these federal laws were enacted, similar legislation already existed in many states. To approximate an experimental framework, this study exploits variation in state-level prohibitions on age and disability discrimination that were passed prior to the federal laws.
Combining data from the U.S. Censuses of Population with information on federal and state-level discrimination laws by year, this
FIGURE 1
Source: Authors' tabulations based on the 1970±90 U.S. Censuses of Population. For those age 65±70, the percent reporting a disability limiting work is based only on the 1980±90 censuses, as the disability question was not asked of this age group in the 1970 census. study finds mixed results regarding the coupling of age and disability discrimination laws. On one hand, the positive employment effect of protection by an age discrimination law is larger among individuals in states with disability discrimination laws. This positive interaction effect on employment is concentrated among nondisabled workers 40±64 years old and is negative for older individuals who classify themselves as disabled. On the other hand, however, disability discrimination laws are associated with slightly lower employment among the nondisabled, so that the coupling of protection by an age discrimination law and the presence of a disability discrimination law in the state is not associated with a difference in the level of employment among the nondisabled and is associated with lower employment for older disabled workers, both relative to protection by an age discrimination law alone. Only among disabled workers under age 40 is the coupling of the laws associated with higher employment levels relative to age-law protection alone.
The earnings regressions indicate that for workers over 40 years old, the positive earnings effect of protection by an age discrimination law is larger when age-law protection is coupled with a disability discrimination law. However, for most groups this positive interaction effect is offset by the negative effect of disability discrimination laws on earnings in general, so that net earnings are not significantly different between those with the coupled laws and those protected only by an age discrimination law. Only for older disabled workers are earnings levels significantly different with the coupled laws: older disabled workers who are protected by age discrimination laws and have a disability discrimination law in their state have lower earnings than older disabled workers having only agelaw protection.
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAWS

A. Age Discrimination Laws
As noted in the introduction, the first federal legislation protecting workers based on age is the 1967 ADEA.
2 At the time of passage of the ADEA, however, several states had already enacted their own age discrimination laws. In Table 1 In 1978, the ADEA was amended to cover those age 40±70 years old, so all those age 65±70 also became covered by the federal law by 1980. Of course, those in the age ranges specified by broader state laws in place by each census year are also covered. Information on the enforcement of age discrimination laws is also included in Table 1 , letting the variable ADWE denote laws that were passed with either weak or no enforcement authority (e.g., Georgia's law and Colorado's law before 1990). In addition, the ADEA in 1970 is denoted as having weak enforcement, because the Department of Labor was initially designated to administer the law and relatively few resources were devoted to enforcing it. With the 1978 amendment to the ADEA, administration of the law was transferred to the EEOC and more resources were available for its enforcement (Stone, 1980) . The theoretical effects of age discrimination laws on the employment of older individuals have been discussed by Lazear (1979) and Neumark and Stock (1999) . The laws prohibit discrimination in hiring and discharge of protected individuals. However, because older workers have relatively low turnover 2. It is useful to provide a definition of what it means to be protected by an age discrimination law. The wording of state laws varies, but most are similar in language to the ADEA, which states,``It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age'' (ADEA x623(4)). Thus someone who is in the age group protected by the law could sue if hiring, firing, or conditions of his or her employment were based on age. Neumark (2003) includes a discussion of specific case law interpretations of the employment protections offered by the ADEA. 
and job mobility, they are more likely to be currently employed than at the hiring stage (Jaeger and Stevens, 1999) . On net, the prohibition against discrimination in discharges implies increased employment of older workers because of a reduction in involuntary terminations.
There has been surprisingly scant research on the empirical impacts of age discrimination laws on labor market outcomes. The evidence includes studies by Neumark and Stock (1999) using U.S. Census data and Adams (2000) using Current Population Survey data. Both studies find that age discrimination prohibitions boost the employment of workers age 60 and over. Adams also finds that age discrimination prohibitions have negative effects on the probability that a worker age 65 or older is a new hire, which he attributes to a reduction in retirement for this age group because of the ADEA. In a study that focuses on the ADEA's elimination of mandatory retirement, Ashenfelter and Card (2000) find that the elimination of mandatory retirement for professors was also associated with reductions in retirement.
In terms of the effects of these laws on older workers' earnings, the evidence is scarcer. Neumark and Stock (1999) do not focus on this question per se, but their estimates indicate a steepening of age-earnings profiles associated with age discrimination laws, which is consistent with the laws positively impacting the earnings of older workers.
B. Disability Discrimination Laws
As with the ADEA, several states passed disability discrimination legislation protecting private-sector workers prior to the passage of the ADA. Beegle and Stock (2003) present a comprehensive review of these state-level disability discrimination laws protecting privatesector workers, and in Table 1 , their summary of this legislation is repeated. Because no state had a disability discrimination law covering the private sector by 1970, Table 1 only includes disability discrimination laws in place by 1980 and 1990. In addition, coverage based on the ADA is not included in the table because data from the 2000 census is not yet available to assess the impact of this federal law using this empirical framework. Instead, the focus is on the effects of state disability discrimination laws.
The variable DDL is a dummy variable equal to one for states that had any disability discrimination law covering workers in the private sector as of each census decade. The variable RA is a dummy variable equal to one for states for which the discrimination law included a clause requiring employers to make reasonable accommodation of worker disabilities (for example, altering facilities or changing the pace of work). Although these laws varied along other dimensions (e.g., size of employers covered), these differences are not the focus here, in part because census data do not provide sufficiently detailed information with which to explore the nuances of the laws. Instead, the average effects of the laws are estimated. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) discuss the theoretical impacts of laws designed to protect disabled workers. Prohibitions against discrimination in hiring effectively provide a subsidy to hiring the disabled, because not hiring a disabled worker increases the risk of a costly 
a For the law coding, year refers to laws in place as of the last year prior to the census. For example``1960'' refers to all laws in place as of 1959, the year to which the 1960 census earnings questions refer. b ADWE indicates an age discrimination law with weak enforcement authority. c RA indicates states with a reasonable accommodation clause included in the disability discrimination legislation. Sources: Neumark and Stock (1999) , Beegle and Stock (2003) , and Neumark (2003) .
lawsuit for the firm. Alternatively, prohibitions against discrimination in firing raise the costs of hiring disabled workers through an increased risk of a lawsuit associated with firing a disabled worker. Empirically, most lawsuits brought under the ADA have been for wrongful termination rather than for discrimination in hiring (DeLeire, 2000; Mudrick, 1997) , implying that the firm's perceived costs of firing would be higher than for not hiring.
3 Coupled with reasonable accommodation requirements making it more costly to hire disabled workers, the net result would be a reduction in hiring of the disabled. Of course, these negative employment effects may be somewhat offset if reasonable accommodation requirements (or other favorable labor market conditions for disabled workers) induce an increase in the supply of disabled workers.
Empirical studies that attempt to evaluate the impact of the ADA draw varied conclusions. Using data from the 1988±97 Current Population Survey, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find a negative impact of the ADA on the employment of male disabled persons and female disabled persons under 40 years old but no effect on the wages of disabled workers. DeLeire (2000) uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1986 to 1995 and concludes that employment rates of men with disabilities fell due to the ADA, but he finds no significant effect of the ADA on relative wages. DeLeire interprets these results as implying that the ADA, through its requirement for reasonable accommodation, increased the cost of employing disabled workers. Alternatively, Kruse and Schur (2003) also use the SIPP and find that disabled employment rates increased with the ADA when an alternative definition of disability is used. Bound and Waidmann (2002) present time-series and cross-state evidence that the relative decline in employment among people with disabilities was associated with the expansion in the Disability Insurance program in the 1990s and not the ADA. Beegle and Stock (2003) take a different approach by investigating the impact of statelevel disability discrimination laws. They find that disability discrimination laws are associated with lower relative earnings for the disabled, but not lower employment rates, once preexisting employment trends among the disabled are taken into consideration.
C. Coupled Age and Disability Discrimination Legislation
In sum, the studies cited on age discrimination laws find that these laws tend to boost employment of protected workers, while the evidence on the impacts of disability discrimination laws is less conclusive. 4 Although researchers have examined the effects of age and disability discrimination laws separately, no one has yet investigated whether disability discrimination legislation coupled with age discrimination legislation offers additional protection or is associated with lower employment or earnings for covered workers. As noted in the introduction, Frier (1993, p. 178) argues that the BFOQ exception to the ADEA allows a firm to use age as a criteria in its employment decisions if the firm caǹ`s how that it has reasonable cause to believe 3. Similarly, a higher proportion of charges brought under the ADEA have been for wrongful discharge than for discrimination in hiring (Posner, 1995) , with the implication that the ADEA would also imply reduced hiring of older workers. However, because older individuals are more likely to be currently employed than at the hiring stage, the prohibition of discrimination in discharges implies increased employment via a reduction in involuntary terminations for them.
4. Although the perception of discrimination motivated these laws, it is difficult to identify the extent to which age or disability discrimination exists (or existed) in the labor market. There are bodies of literature assessing court cases filed under the ADEA (e.g., Schuster and Miller, 1984) and measuring the extent of discrimination against older workers (e.g., Hutchens, 1988; Hirsch et al., 2000) . Regarding disability discrimination, some studies find that discrimination accounts for between 30% and 50% of the wage differential between disabled and nondisabled workers (Johnson and Lambrinos, 1985; Baldwin and Johnson, 1994, 1995) . On the other hand, DeLeire (2001) finds that only 3.7% of the earnings differential is due to discrimination against disabled workers.
5. Note that the presence of dual laws may not be a random event. Beegle and Stock (2003) found no evidence that disability discrimination laws were systematically related to other state characteristics (e.g., the prevalence of disabled in the state). Holbrook and Percy (1992) found that variables traditionally successful at explaining other types of state policies were generally much less successful at explaining the status of disability rights laws and that an explanation of differences in the laws across states requires other, less orthodox approaches, such as understanding the political dynamics in each state. In the present study, probit estimates (available from the authors) indicated that state characteristics, such as the age distribution, the percent disabled, and the disabled-nondisabled employment gap in the state, were not significantly associated with the probability that a state had both types of laws.
that all or substantially all of a class of applicants would be unable to perform a job safely and efficiently'' and that``the BFOQ is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.'' Disability discrimination laws, however, make establishing a BFOQ defense under the ADEA more difficult because some age-related employment problems could be solved by reasonable accommodation. As a result, the effectiveness of age discrimination laws may be altered in the presence of disability discrimination laws. At the same time, because reasonable accommodation provisions and prohibitions against firing in disability discrimination laws make employing the disabled more costly, the coupling of laws could also generate negative employment changes for covered workers. Thus, it is of interest to investigate the effects of the two types of laws together, in part to test whether the impact of age laws is different in the presence of disability laws and also to estimate net employment and earnings changes associated with the coupled laws relative to age discrimination protection in isolation.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The empirical analysis is designed to examine whether the access to disability discrimination legislation offers additional employment and earnings protections to those available through age discrimination legislation alone. Data from the 1960±90 U.S. Censuses of Population are merged with the variables coded in Table 1 describing age and disability discrimination laws by state and year. The 1% public use microdata samples are used for 1960 and 1970 (using the 5% questionnaire sample for 1970); for 1980 and 1990, 1% subsamples are extracted from the A samples, which identify all states.
6 The sample contains white males age 18±70, excluding nonwhites and females to avoid confounding the effects of age discrimination and disability discrimination laws with those of race and sex discrimination laws. The sample excludes self-employed, unpaid, agricultural, and public sector workers (including those in the armed forces). Also excluded are those with missing data (for example, those who reported being employed but did not report their industry or earnings). The earnings analysis uses the subsample of full-time workers (those working 27 or more weeks per year and 30 or more hours per week). Individuals are considered employed if any earnings are observed for the previous calendar year. Finally, the earnings variable is the log of annual earnings, and weeks and hours worked are regressors.
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The simplest approach to assessing the impact of coupled age and disability discrimination laws is to use the 1960±90 census data and the coverage of the ADEA starting in 1968. Thus, those in age ranges covered by their respective state laws are protected by an age discrimination law in 1960. All 40±65-year-olds are protected by the federal age discrimination law in 1970, and all 40±70-year-olds are protected by the ADEA by 1980. Younger individuals in states with laws that cover younger ages than the federal law are also protected (e.g., Colorado before 1990 and Florida starting in 1980) . This strategy allows one to identify two separate treatment groups: those in states that went from having neither age nor disability discrimination laws to having only age discrimination laws (e.g., Alaska and California from 1960 to 1970, Arizona and Arkansas from 1960 to 1980) and those in states that went from having neither age nor disability discrimination laws to having both types of laws (e.g., Florida and Iowa from 1970 to 1980). The outcomes for these two groups can then be compared to outcomes for similar individuals in states where the laws did not change (e.g., Colorado from 1960 to 1980). This implies an equation of the following form:
6. The 1970 census used two different long-form questionnaires, one collected from a 15% sample and the other collected from a 5% sample of the population. The 1% samples are drawn from those in the 5% questionnaire sample.
7. The census weeks of work variable refers to the weeks worked in the previous calendar year, whereas hours of work refers to usual weekly hours in the census year. These variables are coded in the census data as categorical variables, so the midpoints of the categories are used.
where Y represents an outcome (employment or log earnings) of individual i in state s and year t. The vector X is a set of standard demographic controls (age and its square, residence in a standard metropolitan statistical area, marital status, and education status). The dummy variable PAD is equal to one for those protected by an age discrimination law. Thus, PAD represents the combination of the presence of either a state or federal age discrimination law and the individual being in the age range protected by the law. PAD is equal to one for those in the age ranges protected by their respective state's law in 1960, those ages 40±65 in 1970, those ages 40±70 in 1980 and 1990, and younger individuals covered by more broad state laws in 1970± 90. DDL is equal to one for those in states with a disability discrimination law at time t. S is a vector of state dummies, and T is a vector of year dummies, so that b s and b t identify differences in Y across states (for all years) and across time (for all states) for all individuals. It is also possible to include interactions between state and year to allow for common fixed effects for observations in the same state and year that are not persistent across years or states.
8 Note, however, that because such interactions are defined by state and year, including them precludes estimation of j because the interactions generate a common intercept shift for all observations in a state and year (and would thus be perfectly collinear with DDL). Finally, (A * T ) is a vector of age dummy by year dummy interactions, so that b At captures differences in trends in outcomes by age group.
In this specification, q identifies the effect being protected by an age discrimination law for those without disability discrimination laws in their state, and j identifies the effect of having a disability discrimination law in one's state for those not also protected by an age discrimination law. One interpretation of g is that it identifies the shift in the effect of being protected by an age discrimination law that is associated with enactment of a disability discrimination law. Of course, one could also interpret g as the shift in the effect of having a disability discrimination law in one's state that is associated with being protected by an age discrimination law. However, given the arguments by Frier (1993) and Posner (1995) highlighted earlier and because age discrimination laws were generally passed prior to disability discrimination laws, it may be more appropriate to use the former interpretation. Apart from the question regarding any change in the effect of PAD associated with DDL (g), one could also investigate the more basic question of whether the passage of state-level disability discrimination laws in addition to coverage by an age discrimination law is associated with changes in the levels of employment or earnings for covered workers, relative to having age-law protection only. This net employment or earnings change would be captured by the sum (g j), which adds the common effect of DDL across those protected and not protected by age discrimination laws (j) to the interaction effect (g) of the two laws.
A. Separate Effects by Age Group
Disability discrimination legislation may interact with age discrimination legislation differently depending on the age of an individual for several reasons. For example, because the rate of job turnover declines as workers age, the expected firing costs associated with the laws should become increasingly relevant with age (as compared to the costs of not hiring), with the result that the laws may boost employment more for older than for younger workers. Alternatively, however, because disabilities become increasingly prevalent and severe as workers age, the net present value of costs of reasonable accommodation becomes larger with age. If accommodation costs increase relative to expected firing costs as workers age, this implies lower employment for older workers. It is therefore of interest to examine the effects of the laws for older and younger individuals separately, rather than just an average effect pooled across age groups. Equation (1) can be augmented to allow separate effects of the legislation for three age groups: those under age 40 (denoted by the dummy variable UNDER40); those age 40±64; and those age 65 or older (denoted by the dummy variable OVER65). This specification 8. All specifications were also estimated while excluding states in the South, because they may systematically differ from other states (for example, Alabama and Mississippi are the only states that have neither type of law by 1990; Virginia and Arkansas never passed state-level age discrimination laws). The results are qualitatively unchanged when these states are excluded from the analysis.
is shown in equation (2).
As before, the q coefficients identify the effects of being protected by only an age discrimination law relative to those without such protection. The g coefficients identify the shift in this effect resulting from having a disability discrimination law in the state, controlling for the impact of disability discrimination laws for those with no age discrimination protection.
9 Because the shift in the effect of the age discrimination laws is identified for those under age 40 and over age 65 (via the g HH and g H coefficients), g estimates the shift in the effect of age discrimination law protection for those 40±64 years old. Finally, the sum (g j) reveals the net impact of the coupled laws for those 40±64 years old, relative to PAD alone.
B. Separate Effects for the Disabled
It is also possible to estimate separate effects of the legislation for workers who classify themselves as disabled. However, the disability question is only available for those in the 1970± 90 censuses, and in the 1970 census it is only available for those under age 65, making the identifying information much more limited.
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For example, the 1960 census can no longer be used, nor can information on 65±70-year-olds in 1970.
11
To see how restricting the sample to the 1970±90 censuses affect the identification strategy, ignore the age limitation implied by the disability question for a moment and focus on estimation of equation (1). Using the 1970± 90 censuses, g and j would be identified based only on two distinct groups of individuals: those over age 65 (the group for whom PAD changes from zero to one with the extension of the ADEA in 1978) in the states that passed disability discrimination laws, and those under 40 years old in states that introduced disability discrimination laws and changed the range of their younger protected group during the 1970±90 period (e.g., Florida, Iowa, Maine, and Kansas).
An approach that generates additional identifying information is to exploit the variation in coverage of the state-level age discrimination laws by noting the weak enforcement of the ADEA prior to 1978 (when enforcement authority for the law was transferred from the Department of Labor to the EEOC) and implicitly assuming that the only age discrimination protection prior to the 1980 census comes from state-level laws.
12 Under this approach, g is identified from a broader set of ages because PAD would now change over the period for those in all age ranges.
Finally, using the disability question in the census implies that those age 65 or older must be excluded from the analysis when information on disability status is included. Thus, if the weak age discrimination laws are ignored, the estimated equation is:
. The separate effects of the disability laws by age (e.g., [DDL * OVER65]) cannot be identified because they would be collinear with DDL and (PAD * OVER65).
10. In 1980 and 1990, the census disability question stipulated that the disability had to have lasted at least six months. The 1970 census did not include this stipulation but did ask how long the disability had lasted. To make 1970 comparable with the other years, persons were classified as disabled if their disability lasted at least six months (Ruggles and Sobek, 1997) .
11. Note that theoretically if the sample is limited to the 1980 and 1990 censuses, a separate effect of the laws for older workers could be identified (i.e., those age 65±70 could be included, because that age group was asked the disability question starting in 1980). However, because the ADEA protected all those age 40±70 starting in 1980, empirically the separate effect of the laws for those age 65±70 could not be identified because PAD * OVER65 would be perfectly collinear with OVER65.
12. Under this approach, protections offered by states where the laws have weak enforcement (e.g., Georgia's law where DIS is equal to one for individuals who classify themselves as having a disability that limits work, and d identifies the intercept shift associated with having a disability. Two additional sets of regressors, DIS * S and DIS * T, allow for separate state effects and time trends in Y for the disabled. This specification allows for estimation of changes in Y associated with the coupled laws, estimated separately for the disabled and by age group.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Estimated Effects of the Laws on Employment
Regression estimates of the combined effects of age discrimination and disability discrimination laws on employment are presented in Table 2 . As discussed, in some specifications the data must be limited to include only the 1970±90 censuses, and identifying information during this period is obtained by ignoring weak age discrimination laws. Thus column (1) presents estimates of equation (2) using the 1960±90 data, and column (2) includes the 1970±90 data but ignores the ADEA prior to 1980. Finally, in columns (3) and (4) the estimates of the previous two columns are repeated while including state dummy * year dummy interactions to control for fixed effects for observations in the same state and year that are not persistent across years or states. These specifications exclude DDL as it is collinear with the state * year interactions.
All four sets of estimates indicate that the positive employment effect of protection by age discrimination laws is larger when these laws are coupled with disability discrimination laws. This positive interaction effect is highest among the 40±64-year-olds, indicating that the effect of PAD increases by roughly 3 percentage points for those in states with disability discrimination laws (the estimates of g in row 1). For the oldest and youngest workers, the interaction effect is smaller and insignificant, as shown by the coefficients and standard errors on (g g H ) and (g g HH ) listed in the middle portion of the table.
Consistent with other research, the estimates of theeffect of agediscrimination law protection for those with no DDL (q) indicate that older workers have higher employment rates when covered by age discrimination laws whereas younger workers (under age 40) do not.
13
Age discrimination laws have the largest positive effects for those age 40±64. The estimates of the effect of disability discrimination laws for those not covered by an age protection law (j) indicate that such laws are associated with lower employment rates in general, although this finding is not robust across specifications.
Finally, the estimates of the sum (g j)Ð the net change in employment associated with the presence of both DDL and PAD, relative to PAD aloneÐindicate that the coupling of the laws is associated with higher employment for those age 40±64, but the estimates are only marginally significant (t 1.83). Note however, that the estimates in Table 2 that include j are somewhat misleading in the sense that they estimate a pooled effect of the laws across the disabled and nondisabled. Table 3 reports estimates of equation (3), which allows for separate effects of the laws for the disabled and nondisabled. Column (1) includes the interaction between disability status (DIS) and PAD * DDL, as well as an interaction between DIS and DDL. Column (2) estimates a differential effect of the laws for those under 40 years old, and column (3) includes state dummy * year dummy interactions.
The coefficient on PAD * DDL is positive and significant in columns (2) and (3), although the magnitude is small, indicating a 2-percentage-point positive shift in the effect of PAD on employment for 40±64-year-old nondisabled persons when a disability discrimination law exists in the state. As the net employment change (g j) estimates in the lower portion of the table indicate, however, the positive shift in the effect of PAD on employment is offset by a negative shift in employment associated with DDL laws in general for this group, so that the employment level of the nondisabled is unchanged with the coupled laws, relative to PAD alone.
For the older disabled, the estimates of the PAD * DDL coefficients (g dg) are negative and significant, and the net employment effect and Colorado's law before 1990) are also ignored. Neumark and Stock (1999) found no statistically significant difference in the employment effects of age discrimination laws when they allowed the ADEA to have weaker enforcement.
13. Due to space constraints, sums and standard errors for (H ) and (HH ) are not shown in the tables but are available from the authors.
(g dg j dj) is also negative and significant, indicating that the combined protection of age and disability discrimination legislation for 40±64-year-old disabled persons is associated with reduced employment levels relative to protection by an age law alone. For younger disabled workers, the estimates indicate that the coupling of age and disability discrimination laws does not significantly boost the positive effect of age discrimination law protection. Combined with a positive employment effect associated with disability discrimination laws for this group, however, the coupling of PAD with DDL is associated with higher net employment levels among younger (under age 40) disabled workers, relative to protection by age discrimination laws alone. The differing employment outcomes by age are consistent with the idea that disability discrimination laws increase the cost of employing the disabled, perhaps more so for the older disabled because the perceived or real extent of disability Notes: Estimates result from ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses and are corrected for clustering of observations by state and year. All specifications include a constant and controls for age and its square and dummies for marital status (one for married and one for widowed, divorced, or separated; never married is the reference group), schooling (less than 12th grade; 1±3 years college or associate's degree; 4 years college or bachelor's degree; and 5 or more years or advanced degree; 12th grade or high school graduate is the reference group), residence in a metropolitan area (SMSA), year (1990 is the reference year), and state (New York is the reference state). All specifications also include controls for being under 40 years old, for being over 65 years old, and age group dummy * year dummy interactions (age group dummies are for ages 25±29, 30±34, 35±39, 40±44, 45±49, 50±54, 55±59, 60±64, and 65±70; age 18±24 is the reference group). Net employment change is computed as the change in employment associated with PAD 1 and DDL 1, relative to PAD 1 and DDL 0 (i.e., the difference in employment associated with having both types of laws, relative to having age discrimination law protection alone). *Significant at 5%. **Significant at 1%.
is higher for that group. It may also be the case that reasonable accommodation requirements and prohibitions against nondiscrimination in hiring are more relevant for the younger disabled. Table 4 reports the estimates of the combined effect of age discrimination and disability (2) and (3) also include a control for being under 40 years old. Sample includes only individuals age 18±64 and only the 1970±90 censuses.
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B. Estimated Effects of the Laws on Earnings
14. The requirement of reasonable accommodation of disabilities by employers is an important aspect of many of the disability discrimination laws. To examine the incremental effect of this requirement, some specifications also included controls (and interactions) for the presence of a reasonable accommodation clause in the individual's respective state statute (i.e., the RA variable shown in Table 1 ). These estimates indicate that for older disabled workers, net employment changes were not significantly different, whereas for younger disabled workers net employment changes were less positive when the combined laws include a reasonable accommodation clause. There was no differential effect on net earnings when disability discrimination laws included this clause. discrimination laws on log annual earnings. As in the employment regressions, the positive effect of being protected by an age discrimination law is boosted in the presence of a disability discrimination law for workers age 40±64, and the shift in the effect is even larger for workers over age 65. For workers under 40 years old, the shift in the effect of age discrimination law protection associated with disability discrimination laws is positive though small and statistically insignificant. There is a net gain in earnings levels for older workers with PAD and DDL, relative to those who are protected by age laws only. However, as noted, this estimate pools the effect of the laws across the disabled and nondisabled. Table 5 presents estimates of the earnings equation while allowing for separate effects of the laws for disabled workers. The estimates that are pooled across age groups are small and insignificant (column [1] ). The estimates in columns (2) and (3) allow separate effects of the laws by age and disability status. The presence of a disability discrimination law does not have Notes: See notes to Table 2 . Controls for hours and weeks worked (constructed as midpoints of ranges reported in the census), industry (dummies for construction; transportation, communication, and utilities; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; business and repair services; personal services; entertainment and recreation services; professional and related services; and mining; manufacturing is the reference industry), and occupation (dummies for technical sales and administrative support occupations; service occupations; craft, repair, and precision production occupations; and operators, fabricators, and laborers; managerial, professional, and technical specialty occupations are the reference) are also included. Those working fewer than 27 weeks or 30 hours per week are excluded. Earnings in the 1960±70 censuses are recorded in $100 intervals (and in 1960, earnings above $10,000 are recorded in intervals of $1000). The earnings figures were converted from categorical values to the midpoints of the categories. The earnings in the 1980 and 1990 censuses, which are recorded as midpoints of $10 intervals, were not adjusted. The authors also imposed a lower limit on earnings, eliminating individuals from the regressions whose earnings would have been less than $1 per hour (1980 dollars) based on half-time, half-year work. a significant interaction with age discrimination protection for any of the four categories of workers. Only for disabled workers age 40± 64 are earnings significantly different with the coupled laws. For this group, the coupling of the laws is associated with lower earnings relative to age discrimination law protection alone, suggesting that the negative impact of DDL on earnings in general outweighs any positive shift in the effect of PAD on earnings associated with disability discrimination laws.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Previous researchers have examined separately the effects of employment protections for older workers available through the ADEA and state-level age discrimination laws and for disabled workers though the ADA and state-level disability discrimination laws. The research on the impact of age discrimination prohibitions indicates that these laws are associated with higher employment levels (andperhapshigherearnings)forolderworkers. However, because some older workers may not be eligible for the protection offered under age discrimination laws (for example, due to exemptions allowed by the ADEA based on a BFOQ), they may be better protected instead through the ADA or similar disability discrimination legislation. On the other hand, reasonable accommodation clauses and prohibitions against discrimination in firing raise the costs of employing the disabled, in which case the coupling of the laws may be associated with lower employment for protected workers.
The impact on employment and earnings of having both types of laws is investigated. The estimates indicate that the positive employment effect of protection by age discrimination laws is higher for those who live in states with disability discrimination laws. The positive shift in the employment effect of age discrimination law protection associated with disability discrimination laws is significant for the nondisabled age 40±64 but negative for the disabled age 40±64. Among the nondisabled, the positive shift in the employment effect of age discrimination law protection is offset by the negative overall impact associated with disability discrimination laws, with the result that overall employment is unchanged for those with both age-law protection and disability discrimination laws in their state, relative to those with age-law protection alone. Among the disabled, the coupled laws are associated with lower employment for older workers and higher employment for younger workers, relative to age-law protection alone, which is consistent with the idea that prohibitions against nondiscrimination in hiring associated with disability discrimination laws may be more relevant for younger workers. The earnings regression estimates suggest that the only statistically significant change in net earnings associated with the coupled laws is for disabled workers age 40±64, for whom the coupled laws are associated with lower earnings than protection by age discrimination laws alone.
